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WALMART IN CHINA 
INTRODUCTION 
When the World's Largest Company 
Encounters the World's Biggest Country 
Anita Chan 
Many books have been published about Walmart, not least be-
cause it is the biggest corporation in the world.1 Walmart's colossal size 
enables it to affect the agenda of world production and trade. Walmart's 
market impact within America is reflected in a catchy book tide, The United 
States of Wal-Mart? Though such books tend to touch on Walmart's reach 
beyond the United States, and in at least one case even contains a chapter 
on Walmart's reach in China,3 there has not yet been a book devoted to 
Walmart's significant presence in China. China today is the source of the 
great majority of the merchandise Walmart sells. China has also emerged as 
one of Walmart's largest and fastest growing retail markets, with close to 
two hundred giant Walmart stores spread across China's provinces. 
What happens when the world's largest corporation encounters the 
world's biggest country? There are two areas of special interest—the impact 
of the Walmart supply chain, including the impact on the Chinese workers 
who manufacture Walmart products; and separately, Walmart's retail busi-
ness and its brand of management practices when imported across cultures 
into the Walmart supercenters inside China. In both respects, has Walmart 
succeeded in a Walmartization of China? 
WALMARTIZATION 
The impact of Walmart on retail business in the United States and be-
yond has been so enormous in the past few decades that a new expres-
sion, "Walmartization," has entered the English lexicon. Anything can 
1 
be "Walmartized": from "wal-martization of the U.S. economy," "wal-
martization of organics," "wal-martization of education," "wal-martization 
of health," to "wal-martization of embyros" and the list goes on.4 Origi-
nally, "Walmartization" was a pejorative phrase used to describe the eco-
nomic impact of large outer-suburb shopping outlets and big box stores 
on small commercial districts and locally owned businesses.5 Economies of 
scale allowed Walmart to buy cheap and sell cheap so that it could honor 
its "everyday low price" promise to consumers. Any similar kind of big-
eats-small phenomenon of mass marketing earned that pejorative label of 
Walmartization. 
A second pejorative meaning of the term has been from the perspective of 
labor—the charge that Walmart undercut local stores' wages and provided 
little or no benefits such as health insurance, coupled to a well-organized 
antiunionization policy that has been so successful that in a period of sev-
eral decades, not one out of the more than four thousand Walmart stores 
in the United States has been obliged to recognize a union presence. Of 
course, Walmart is not the only company that is antiunion. But Walmart 
has set the standard for other retailers and industrialists. For this, Walmart 
has gained the wrath of the American trade union movement.6 As described 
by two academic labor sociologists, "Wal-Mart represents an employment 
and industrial relations model far removed from the Fordist consensus of 
the postwar period (in which General Motors set the standards: relatively 
stable employment, secure benefits, and rising wages in exchange for pro-
ductivity increases and protracted periods of labor peace)."7 
The term Walmartization has been used in a third sense: that Walmart's 
great size and bargaining power as a purchaser has changed the manufac-
turing system from being producer-driven to retailer-driven. It has been 
argued that producers today have had to bow to a retailer with a dominant 
market share in order to acquire sufficient orders to sustain production. 
When manufacturers could not meet Walmart's low-price demands, Wal-
mart looked abroad for cheap production sites—in particular, in China. 
Which brings us to our initial questions: As China became the most 
sought after manufacturing region, and as Walmart started sourcing a very 
high percentage of its products there, has this in any way Walmartized 
China? Have Walmart's pricing strategies put pressures on Chinese sup-
pliers and in turn adversely affected Chinese workers' work conditions or 
wages? Have Walmart's employment policies at its Chinese stores positively 
or adversely affected the retail workers' circumstances? Has Walmart suc-
ceeded in keeping Chinese unions at arm's length? 
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The chapter authors are all well qualified to write on these and other re-
lated issues. The great majority are experienced academic researchers on in-
dustrial and commercial practices. Most have previously engaged in research 
inside China, and all but one of the contributors are fluent in Chinese. Sev-
eral of us initially came together because of our shared research interests 
and decided to concentrate on the different aspects of Walmart's operations 
in China because of its scale and its importance to the new shape of global 
manufacturing and retailing. When funding became available, we were able 
to begin field research and contacted others who had been conducting re-
search on Walmart to join in a cooperative international effort.8 The con-
tributors to this book are spread around the world, with six located in the 
United States, four in Australia, two in Hong Kong, and one in China. 
There has been a lot of interest within China about Walmart's large pres-
ence there, with numerous Chinese press reports this past decade about 
Chinese-based production of Walmart merchandise and Walmart's rapid 
entry into the Chinese retail market.9 As a result, part way through our 
research and writing, we held a conference at Beijing University in July 
2007,10 so that we could share our initial findings with specialists from 
within China and obtain their feedback. Some sixty Chinese academics and 
trade-union staff members participated in the conference, and it became 
obvious that their belief in the importance of conducting research on Wal-
mart's massive operations in China was as great as our own. 
WALMARTIZ INC THE GLOBAL PRODUCTION C H A I N IN C H I N A 
Nelson Lichtenstein's chapter provides a background on Walmart's ori-
gins in the rural heartland of Arkansas and its growth in past decades, its 
domestic sourcing policy, its innovative corporate policy of low prices, its 
unique corporate culture, and its strategies to beat out major competitors. 
Lichtenstein also discusses how, when domestic sources could no longer 
meet Walmart's low-price policy, Walmart turned principally to sourcing 
overseas, mainly from Asia. 
Walmart was not the only multinational of the developed North to turn 
to sourcing heavily from the developing world. Back in the 1970s this reloca-
tion of the world's manufacturing site of intensive labor production to Asia 
had nurtured the growth of the Four Little Dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore). When China began to open up to foreign in-
vestment in the early 1980s, offering vast stretches of greenfield sites and an 
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abundance of labor far cheaper than the Dragons, another wave of regional 
manufacturing relocation was set in motion. Brand-name companies like 
Nike at that time encouraged and helped its main Taiwanese manufactur-
ing partners to move their factories to China. So massive was this reloca-
tion of Asian supplier companies that the majority of the so-called Chinese 
manufacturing suppliers today are actually Four Little Dragon companies 
that have set up assembly plants in China. In the past decade, local Chinese 
capital also has increasingly been drawn into the supply chain. 
Walmart reportedly sources some 70 percent of its merchandise from 
China. So rapid and massive was this shift to goods manufactured in China 
that by the middle of the first decade of this century Walmart alone im-
ported more from China than many nations did. It became China's sixth 
largest export market—just behind Germany—in 2004, buying some 
$18 billion worth of goods.11 When the two giants Walmart and China es-
tablished a stable symbiotic relationship at the turn of the millennium, and 
as Walmartization of the supply chain took root on Chinese soil, Walmart's 
competitors had to use the same sourcing techniques to survive. 
Once sourcing from China became a bandwagon, Walmart contributed, 
as observed in chapter 2 by Xue Hong, in driving down the wages in sup-
plier factories. While brand-name companies like Nike have their reputa-
tions to protect against high-end consumers' concerns that their purchases 
might be made by exploited labor, a retailer like Walmart does not build 
its reputation around a brand-name product that needs protection. Selling 
relatively low-end merchandise, with an ability to place massive orders, it 
largely strives to use this advantage to source more cheaply than its compet-
itors. Xue Hong's chapter describes in detail how Walmart places orders and 
squeezes suppliers in China, who face pressures to go along. In the process, 
migrant workers in the supplier factories bear the brunt of the pressure to 
cut costs. Each tier of suppliers in the supply chain places price pressures on 
its own suppliers and subcontracting manufacturers, and Xue Hong shows 
that the greater the number of tiers and the longer the production chain, the 
lower the wages in the bottom rung of this pecking order of companies. 
The chapter by Yu Xiaomin and Pun Ngai, which focuses on two toy facto-
ries as case studies, observes how Walmart took over from Toys "R" Us as the 
world's biggest toy retailer. They provide details on how this happened, how 
Walmart exercises its sourcing practices and low wage policy, and how work-
ers at the two factories were pressed to work very long hours for low wages. 
As China gradually became the world's manufacturing workshop, the 
wages in China's export sector competitively affected wages and labor 
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standards throughout the Global South.12 As multinationals increased 
their sourcing from factories located in the poor nations of the South, 
an antisweatshop movement consisting of American university students, 
trade unions, NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and church groups 
emerged seeking to halt the downward drive of wages and work conditions. 
Both Xue Hong's and Pun and Yu's chapters discuss how the antisweatshop 
movement instigated the global proliferation of corporate codes of conduct. 
Eager to join the club, Walmart drew up its own corporate code of ethical 
standards and hired monitors to audit suppliers' factories in China. Both 
chapters demonstrate the difficulties Walmart faced in implementing this 
and the ineffectiveness of the monitoring exercise.13 The irony is Pun and 
Yu's discovery that at the two Walmart supplier factories they studied, the fac-
tory that experienced repeated monitoring nonetheless continued to impose 
worse conditions on its workers than the one that was not monitored. 
In the past two decades a large number of reports from academics and 
labor NGOs have documented poor work conditions and low pay among 
China's export-industry workers who make products for multinationals like 
Walmart, but the data have been anecdotal. Anita Chan and Kaxton Siu's 
chapter goes beyond this narrative level by conducting a statistical survey 
of workers from nine Walmart supplier factories (four garment and five toy 
factories). In analyzing wages and work hours, they show that the piece 
rates used in the garment industry result not only in a lower hourly wage 
rate than the time rates used in the toy industry but also that the more hours 
garment workers work each month, the lower their hourly wage. Analyzing 
workers' attitudinal responses, they compute what they call workers' "toler-
ance level" for exhaustion when subjected to excessive overtime. They argue 
that today's global production chain produces a "sweating" condition that 
is a throwback to the days of the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in the West. 
The several book chapters on Walmart's supply chain and its suppliers 
in China warrant Pun and Yu using the expression "Walmartization." The 
technique of squeezing suppliers has been popularized in the corporate 
world, though no other corporation can do it on the same scale as Walmart. 
The new elaborate logistics technology first used by Walmart is fast becom-
ing standard practice. The factories studied in these three chapters all have 
multiple buyers, since the supplier companies try to ensure they do not 
- become totally dependent on Walmart. But the workers in these factories 
toil today under the same conditions and wages regardless of whether the 
products they make are destined for Walmart or for other buyers. 
Introduction 5 
There is a perpetual search for localities that can offer lower produc-
tion costs. Thus the symbiotic relationship between Walmart and China 
is changeable. In 2007, for instance, the world's largest manufacturer of 
socks, Langsha, refused to take Walmart orders because it claimed the 
price offered by Walmart was too low for the Chinese company to make 
any profit. Chinese labor costs were rising, and Walmart began looking 
more intensively for procurements elsewhere. Walmart was also mindful of 
protectionist pressures within America against China. That same year, Lee 
Scott, Walmart's CEO, observed that even if Walmart reduced sourcing 
from China, labor-intensive jobs would never return to the United States: 
"Even with the economic nationalism that's emerging today, the anti-China 
kind of thing, much of the product, if it moves out of China because of tar-
iffs, is going to move to Indonesia, or Vietnam or Cambodia."14 If another 
regional labor-intensive manufacturing relocation was needed, this would 
only mean another wave of Walmartization in another part of the world. 
For the time being the situation is still relatively stable and most of 
Walmart's merchandise continues to flow from Chinese-based factories, 
but Walmart is also hedging its bets by diversifying. In 2010 Walmart an-
nounced that it had decided to source garments from Bangladesh in a big 
way. Knitwear and woven garment exports make up 75 percent of this poor 
country's exports, and 30 percent of Bangladesh's garment exports to the 
United States already went to Walmart. In February 2010 the Bangladesh 
Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association revealed after a visit by 
Walmart International's CEO that Walmart plans to double its purchases to 
$2 billion a year and would source 20 percent of its garments from Bangla-
desh. At a meeting in Dhaka with the association, the CEO strongly urged 
that a comprehensive garment industrial zone be established.15 Notably, 
such zones are exempted from Bangladesh's national labor laws and trade 
unions are prohibited.16 In China, Walmart does not take the initiative to 
reshape the landscape in the same way as in Bangladesh. Walmart adjusts its 
protocol in accordance with the strength of the state it deals with. 
WALMARTIZ INC WALMART STORES I N C H I N A 
As the middle-class in urban China began expanding rapidly Walmart 
moved into the People's Republic beginning in the late 1990s to capture a share 
of their spending, and by 2010 it had close to 200 giant stores across China. 
Unlike in the United States, where Walmart is a low-end retailer, Walmart in 
China largely 
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China largely serves the rising middle-class. Some of the stores in China fea-
ture large parking lots to accommodate the new auto-owning urbanites. 
Walmart cannot Walmartize its China-based Taiwanese, Korean, and 
Hong Kong-owned manufacturing suppliers by injecting into them the 
Walmart corporate culture and management methods. But Walmart can do 
so at its stores in China, where Walmart has direct management control over 
employees. In the first of the four chapters on Walmart's retail operations, 
David Davies analyzes the Walmart corporate culture in one of the Walmart 
stores. A second chapter, by Davies and Taylor Seeman, tells the story of a 
Walmart store general manager, Edward. The third chapter contains diary 
entries of a low-level supervisor named Li Shan. The fourth discusses the 
working conditions of a cashier at a Walmart store. Together their stories 
provide a glimpse into the world of Walmart retail employees at differ-
ent levels. A question is: What occurred to Walmart management culture 
when it was transferred to China? How does it differ from the corporate 
culture back in America, and how do different levels of Chinese employees 
adapt to, reject, or live with this culture? Has Walmartization succeeded in 
inculcating some fifty thousand Chinese store employees into embracing 
the company culture that Nelson Lichtenstein discusses in chapter i? These 
chapters show that the answer is not black and white. 
To begin with, what are the essential elements of Walmart's corporate 
culture that was created by Sam Walton in the early days of Walmart? As 
Lichtenstein describes it, Walmart culture bears the hallmark of the rural 
American Bible Belt of the 1950s and preaches the virtues of frugality, self-
cultivation, obedience, and diligence. Walmart's corporate culture was 
also characterized by a personality cult exalting Sam Walton, bombarding 
employees with slogans and teachings of the great leader, extolling work-
place paternalism, didacticism, communitarianism, and collectivism. By 
happenstance, as David Davies points out, these share much in common 
with Maoist and Confucian teachings. The culture and institutional meth-
ods of implementation are not that alien to the Chinese populace. 
There is also a hierarchic dimension in these three case studies of employ-
ees: the higher the rank, the easier it is for the employee to accept the Walmart 
culture, in part because it is his/her role to impart this culture to the charges. 
Davies has coined the term corporate cadres, "because management is held to 
standards and expectations that discipline their behavior even as they must 
rely upon it to discipline others as they manage day-to-day work at stores." 
Li Shan, a lower-level supervisor, never believed in the Walmart culture to 
the same extent as the store manager Edward. It was not his job to preach 
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that culture, being on the receiving end. He was keen to learn the success of 
business management techniques from the world's biggest corporation, but 
to him the culture was an instrumental vehicle, a management tool. 
Lihua, Eileen Otis's research assistant, became a participant observer at 
a Walmart store by working there as a cashier. Her research role required 
her to be "objective," to observe the culture from the outside. But in her 
description of the induction of the other new lower-level employees by 
the store's management, the Walmart culture did not seem to have been 
inculcated in the new recruits either. This could be seen in the extremely 
high turnover rate of ordinary workers. Out of thirty new recruits, after 
two months only three remained. The efforts to instill a corporate culture 
of loyalty, to raise morale, and to dangle carrots did not compensate for 
the high intensity of the work (especially for cashiers), a "techno-despotic" 
labor regime (a term coined by Otis), low pay, pressure to work harder 
and faster, and surveillance by supervisors and customers. In a manual job 
where a daily concern to eke out a living takes precedence, the Walmart 
culture leaves little impact. In all of these case studies of employees, the 
Walmart cheer that Walton invented after being inspired by what he saw in 
Korea did not seem effective. It was at best a ritual that employees had to 
go through under the watchful eyes of supervisors. 
Edward was surprised to learn when he went for training in Bentonville, 
Arkansas, that many aspects of the Walmart corporate culture in the United 
States did not survive Sam Walton. Today in the back rooms of American 
Walmart stores there are barely any displays of the Walmart cultural para-
phernalia, whereas in Chinese stores, as described in great detail by David 
Davies, the displays at the front and in the back rooms of the stores are 
elaborate and dominating, with Sam Walton staring you in the face. No 
employee can escape them. The Walmart culture and its moralizing perme-
ate the stores as constant didactic reminders. Perhaps only in China, where 
slogan displays still prevail throughout the urban landscape, do employees 
so easily accept the bombardment. Walmartizing the original U.S. Walmart 
culture can, at least superficially, claim some success in China, if not among 
the rank and file then among managers. 
WALMART, THE CHINESE U N I O N S , A N D THE CHINESE STATE 
In July 2006 the All-Chinese Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
declared the establishment of a union branch in one of the stores. 
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taking Walmart by surprise. Today, all Walmart stores in China have union 
branches. Chapter 9 explores why and how the Walmart store unions were 
set up, and why they have been accepted by Walmart. It will be seen that 
when the largest corporation in the world had to deal with a strong state, it 
had to capitulate, but secured provisions to do so on its own terms. 
One aspect that should be noted was the lack of knowledge of trade 
unionism among lower-level union officials and workers. As will be seen in 
chapter 10, the only union model that local Chinese union officials know 
is the Maoist corporatist model of working closely with management. The 
role of a union branch at a state factory under Mao was to organize social 
events and provide nonwage benefits on behalf of management. As inter-
views conducted for chapter 10 also show, Walmart store workers from 
the countryside are likely not even to have previously heard of the word 
union and were unsure what it is supposed to do. Even a store manager like 
Edward had never had any contact with trade unions until he was suddenly 
told one existed at his store. (Neither do labor NGOs in China that work 
closely with factory workers have much understanding of trade unions.) 
Walmart accepted union representation at the workplace in circumstances 
where at most stores there was no knowledge among potential participants 
of what this might entail and where Walmart could control events without 
opposition. 
This book, in sum, examines Walmart's operations in China from a num-
ber of important angles. It examines how and why Walmart turned to China 
as the main source of its merchandise. It examines Walmart's relations with 
the many thousands of manufacturers based in China who supply the huge 
retailer with the bulk of its products. And it penetrates a number of facto-
ries there that produce Walmart goods and investigates shop-floor work 
conditions and labor standards. Other chapters reach inside the giant Wal-
mart stores that have sprung up across China. They explore the nature of 
Walmart's corporate culture within the stores and how it has been shaped 
to fit Chinese employees. In three chapters, the work situations and views 
of employees are examined from the perspective of a store manager, of a 
lower-level supervisor, and of check-out cashiers. And finally, the unioniza-
tion of Walmart's retail operations is examined—one of the few instances 
around the world where Walmart has accepted a union. China looms large 
in the operations of the world's largest corporation, and through extensive, 
rigorous research this book illuminates its various aspects. 
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PART ONE 
The Walmart Supply Chain 
1 WALMART'S LONG MARCH TO CHINA 
How a Mid-American Retailer Came to Stake 
Its Future on the Chinese Economy 
Nelson Lichtenstein 
A globalized world of commerce and labor has existed for cen-
turies, but today's globalization differs radically from that of even a few 
decades past because of the contemporary role played by the corporate king-
makers of our day—the big box retail chains that now occupy the strategic 
heights once so well garrisoned by the great manufacturing firms of the 
Fordist era. At the crux of the global supply chains stand the Walmarts, the 
Home Depots, and the Carrefours. They make the markets, set the prices, 
and determine the worldwide distribution of labor for that gigantic stream 
of commodities that now flows across their counters. The deindustrializa-
tion of Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland entailed not just the destruction 
of a particular set of industries and communities, but the shift of power 
within the structures of world capitalism from manufacturing to a retail 
sector that today commands the supply chains which girdle the earth and 
directs the labor power of a working class whose condition replicates much 
that we once thought characteristic of only the most desperate, early stages 
of capitalism. 
FROM BENTONVILLE TO G U A N G D O N G 
All this is graphically evident on a visit to the two most dynamic nodes 
of today's transnational capitalism—Bentonville and China's Pearl River 
Delta. It is easy to get to Bentonville, Arkansas, where Walmart has its 
world headquarters in an unimpressive, low-slung building close by the 
company's original warehouse. There are lots of direct nights from Denver, 
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Chicago, La Guardia, and Los Angeles to this once-remote Arkansas town. 
Bentonville itself has a population of just twenty-five thousand, but the 
parking lots are full, the streets crowded, and there is new construction 
everywhere. Most important, Bentonville and the rest of northwest Ar-
kansas is now home to at least 750 branch offices of the largest Walmart 
"vendors." They have planted their corporate flag here in the hope that they 
can maintain or increase their sales to the world's largest buyer of consumer 
products. Procter & Gamble (P&G), which in 1987 may well have been the 
first company to put an office in this part of Arkansas, now has a staff of 
more than two hundred there; likewise Sanyo, Levi Strauss, Nestle, John-
son & Johnson, Eastman Kodak, Mattel, and Kraft Foods maintain large 
offices in what the locals sometimes call "Vendorville." Walt Disney's large 
retail business has its headquarters, not in Los Angeles, but in Rogers, Ar-
kansas, right next door to Bentonville. These Walmart suppliers are a who's 
who of American and international business, staffed by ambitious young 
executives who have come to see a posting to once-remote Bentonville as 
the crucial step that can make or break a corporate career.1 If they can meet 
Walmart's exacting price and performance standards, their products will be 
sucked into the stream of commodities that flow through the world's largest 
and most efficient supply chain. For any manufacturer, it is the brass ring of 
American salesmanship; this explains why all those New York, Hong Kong, 
and Los Angeles sophisticates are dining at the surprisingly large number of 
gourmet restaurants that have sprung up in northwest Arkansas. 
If Bentonville represents one nerve center of capitalism's global supply 
network, Guangdong Province is the other. Located in coastal south China, 
it constitutes the raw entrepreneurial engine that links a vast new prole-
tariat to the American retailers who are putting billions of Chinese-made 
products on a million U.S. discount-store shelves every day. With 15 million 
migrant workers, tens of thousands of export-oriented factories, and new 
cities like Shenzhen, which has mushroomed to more than 7 million people 
in just a quarter of a century, Guangdong lays an arguable claim to being 
the contemporary "workshop of the world," following in the footsteps 
of nineteenth-century Manchester and early twentieth-century Detroit. 
This was my thought when we taxied across Dongguan, a gritty, smoggy, 
sprawling landscape located on the east side of the Pearl River between 
Guangzhou and skyscraper-etched Shenzhen. We drove for more than an 
hour late one Sunday afternoon, along broad but heavily trafficked streets 
continuously bordered by bustling stores, welding shops, warehouses, 
small manufacturers, and the occasional large factory complex. 
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The Chinese government in Beijing chose Shenzhen as a special eco-
nomic zone in 1979 because of its proximity to Hong Kong. A few years later 
the entire Pearl River Delta became part of the zone, with low corporate 
taxes, few environmental or urban-planning regulations, and the increas-
ingly free movement of capital and profits. The results were spectacular. 
Gross domestic product in the Pearl River region leaped from US$8 billion 
in 1980 to US$351 billion in 2006. Shenzhen's population rose twentyfold. 
Guangdong Province itself produces a third of China's total exports, and 
almost 10 percent of all that finds its way to Walmart's U.S. shelves.2 
Although Walmart owns no factories outright, its presence is unmis-
takable. Its world buying headquarters is now in Shenzhen, and it has 
already opened more than three hundred stores all over China, with others 
to come. It is feared and respected by everyone involved with any aspect of 
the export trade, which is why the executives at the Yantian International 
Container Terminal in Shenzhen, now the fourth largest port in the world, 
give top priority to cargoes bound for Walmart. 
When Walmart first made the decision to source such a high proportion 
of its products in China, it did so not merely because goods were cheap 
and wages low but because, for Walmart and other multinational companies 
doing business there, a sound currency, excellent infrastructure, political 
stability, and a compliant workforce were nearly as important as low costs. 
Governments at both the provincial and national level were making huge 
infrastructure investments, and similarly tens of thousands of foreign inves-
tors from Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, and the United States 
were building production facilities of increasing complexity and capacity. 
This made it possible to transform raw materials into containerized con-
sumer goods in just a few weeks. Nike managers at the huge Yue Yuen fac-
tory complex in Dongguan bragged that they could fill an order from the 
United States in just two months. Container ships were loaded in half the 
time it took in Los Angeles.3 It took four days for exports to clear customs 
in Guangzhou, eight days in Calcutta, and more than two weeks in Karachi. 
Likewise, the proportion of total production lost to power outages totaled 
2 percent in Guangzhou, but 6 percent in Calcutta and Karachi.4 
A decade ago such stability and efficiency seemed overwhelming com-
pared to other East Asian manufacturing venues. As Andrew Tsuei, then 
managing director of Walmart's global procurement center in Shenzhen 
recognized, there were other countries where products could actually be 
sourced more cheaply. But as he argued, "If we have to look at a country 
that's not politically stable, you might not get your order on time. If you 
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deal in a country where the currency fluctuates every day, there is a lot of 
risk. China happens to have the right mix."5 But as this essay and others in 
this volume make clear, such stability and predictability no longer charac-
terize the procurement operations of Walmart and other global retailers in 
China. Labor unrest, wage increases, and an unpredictable exchange rate 
have generated much tension within the global supply chains dominated 
by Walmart and the other retailers. To evaluate these growing contradic-
tions, a historical understanding of this new socioeconomic phenomenon 
is essential. 
POWER A N D PLACE I N THE RETAIL SUPPLY C H A I N 
Neither Bentonville nor Guangdong, these anchors of the trans-Pacific 
supply chain, are the product of some abstract process of globalization; 
rather, both were constructed by a set of political and policy choices, in 
the United States and throughout the globe, that have shifted power from 
manufacturing to retail distribution, and from an economy in which the 
interests of relatively high-wage men played a central role to one in which 
the flexible, low-wage labor of women is increasingly crucial. 
For most of the twenty-first century, Walmart has occupied the number-
one spot on the Fortune 500 list of the largest American companies. With 
nearly 2 million employees worldwide and sales of more than US$375 bil-
lion in 2008, it is undoubtedly the largest private enterprise on the globe. 
However, size alone is not what makes Walmart and the other great retail-
ers of our day, such as Tesco, Carrefour, Home Depot, and Sears Holdings, 
so important. Rather, it is the power that they command in the world econ-
omy, the leverage that they exert throughout the supply chains that channel 
the commodities from manufacturer to merchant, and from Asia to North 
America and Europe. 
This is not the first time that the merchants have been on top. Retail 
hegemony in the twenty-first century echoes the mercantile regime once 
presided over by the great seventeenth- and eighteenth-century merchant 
and banking houses of Amsterdam, Hamburg, and the City of London. 
By the early nineteenth century, the merchants and traders of Philadel-
phia, New York, and Boston had moved to the fore. In a society in which 
production was highly decentralized and largely that of agricultural com-
modities, the power of these wholesalers, jobbers, and traders to make a 
market and manipulate it for their own purposes put them at the center of 
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commerce, politics, and culture. They owned the clipper ships and railroads 
that extended the supply chains of their day across a continent and around 
the world.6 
In the United States, the Civil War ended this first era of merchant power. 
For more than a century thereafter, until the 1980s, manufacturers set the 
price and determined the market for much of what they sold: the retailers, 
even when combined into large chains, had to take whatever prices and 
products they were offered.7 Today, the merchants again stand at the apex 
of the world's supply chains. Indeed, the very phrase supply chain did not 
even exist twenty years ago. Historians and sociologists such as Emmanuel 
Wallerstein had first developed the idea of a "commodity chain" as part of 
a world systems schema. Then, in the 1980s, business consultants like Bain 
and Company coined the phrase value chain management or supplier ratio-
nalization to describe how components and materials were purchased and 
transformed into saleable goods. Frederick Abernathy and John Dunlop 
used the phrase commodity channels as recendy as 1999 to describe the way 
apparel moved from Asian and Central American suppliers to North Amer-
ican retailers. In the twenty-first century, however, "supply chain," with its 
hard linkages and connotation of domination and subordination, has be-
come the artful phrase. Theorists such as Gary Gereffi and Gary Hamilton 
have emphasized the market-making potential of the contemporary buyer-
driven supply networks in order more clearly to evaluate the hierarchy of 
power and profitability that characterizes contemporary global trade.8 
Much of the global economy is now driven by the supply chains that 
have their nerve centers in Bentonville, Adanta (Home Depot), Minneapo-
lis (Target), Troy, Michigan (K-Mart), Paris (Carrefour), Stockholm (Ikea), 
and Issaquah, Washington (Costco). The goal of these megaretailers is to 
contract for only those goods that consumers will actually buy in a given 
time frame, not what a set of once-powerful supply firms found it convenient 
and profitable to ship. Like Ford's first assembly line, which soon made ob-
solete so many traditional skills and processes in the metal-bending core of 
the U.S. economy, these supply-chain innovations have superseded virtually 
all other configurations in the manufacturer-distributor-retailer nexus. 
Using a wide variety of new information technologies, the big box 
retailers of our day collect point-of-sale (POS) data and relay it electronically 
through their supply chain to initiate replenishment orders almost instan-
taneously. Thus when Walmart sells a tube of toothpaste in Memphis that 
information flashes straight through to Bentonville, then on to the P&G 
headquarters office in Cincinnati, the Ohio home-product manufacturer, 
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which then immediately sends the electronic impulse directly to an offshore 
toothpaste factory, which adjusts its production schedule accordingly. In the 
days when products were made in the United States, P&G had long used 
its market power and sophisticated research on consumer buying habits to 
secure an outsized share of shelf space from traditional retailers. Today, Wal-
mart has turned this power relationship on its head. The retailer's superior 
point-of-sale data collection system enabled Walmart to know more about 
the consumers of P&G products than did the manufacturer, which is one 
reason that P&G moved its main sales office to Bentonville in the 1980s. By 
the mid-1990s, Walmart was P&G's largest customer, generating more than 
US$3 billion in sales, or about 20 percent of P&G's total revenue. But P&G 
executives were well aware that their good fortune turned on Walmart's 
sufferance, which explains why they bought Gillette in 2005. The US$57 
billion deal was designed to transform P&G into an even larger supply firm 
that could challenge Walmart's pricing power and its private label brands, 
but even this megamerger was not enough. "If you want to service Walmart 
you have got to be more efficient," asserted the retail consultant Howard 
Davidowitz. "The power will stay with Walmart."9 
This is "lean retailing." To make it all work, the supply firms and the 
discount retailers have to be functionally linked. The giant retailers of our 
day, Walmart first among them, "pull" production out of their far-flung 
network of vendors, depending on the market. The manufacturers can no 
longer "push" product onto the retailer or the consumer. Constant and un-
predictable changes in sales patterns must be met by just-in-time delivery 
systems. "Supply Chain Management"— that is the new business school 
buzz phrase—is the "science" of getting this to happen in the most efficient 
and cost-effective way.10 
WALMART'S RURAL O R I G I N S 
Walmart's history exemplifies this transmutation, but with a distinctive 
Arkansas accent. The company had its origins and began its stupendous 
growth in what might well seem a highly unlikely place. For most of its his-
tory, the Ozark plateau of northwest Arkansas and southern Missouri has 
been poor, white, and rural. Neither the New Deal nor the civil rights revo-
lution had really come to the region when Sam Walton began to assemble 
his chain of small-town stores in the 1950s and 1960s. At this time the agri-
cultural revolution of the early postwar era was in full swing, depopulating 
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the farms and sending tens of thousands of white women and men in search 
of their first real paycheck. Some left for California or the industrial cities of 
the Great Lakes, but most were anxious to remain, near family, friends and 
small towns they knew so well.11 
Walton took full advantage of these circumstances. He could pay rock-
bottom wages and find a ready supply of grateful workers, especially 
women, who were delighted to exchange the grinding life on a sub-
sistence farm for the sociable world of a small-town discount store. Wal-
ton's folksy paternalism was not a new management style, but he carried 
it off with brio, expressing a barely veiled contempt for the federal laws 
and bureaucratically structured Yankee business practices that sought to 
reshape Southern commerce. Like so many other employers of his time 
and region, Walton played fast and loose with minimum-wage regulations 
and overtime standards, not to mention the new laws governing race and 
gender equality in the workplace. And, of course, Walton and his growing 
army of store managers were bitter foes of any union effort to organize the 
workers in his company. State-level "right-to-work" laws, which deprived 
trade unions of the contractual right to insist that all workers in a firm 
covered by a collective bargaining contract join and pay dues, had been 
passed by the ultraconservatives who dominated most Southern legislatures 
in the 1940s and 1950s. This weakened existing labor organizations, made it 
more difficult to organize new ones, and created an antiunion business cli-
mate that speeded the migration of hundreds of labor-intensive industrial 
firms from the high-wage North to the small towns and rural areas of a still 
desperately poor South. With other Southern firms—in textiles, apparel, 
and food processing—Walmart therefore seized the opportunity to pioneer 
the union avoidance and union-breaking tactics that have become so char-
acteristic of American management in recent years.12 
At the same time, Walmart has projected a corporate culture that has cel-
ebrated family, community, and a faux-egalitarianism, uniting ten-dollar-
an-hour sales clerks with the millionaires who work out of the Bentonville 
corporate headquarters. Although Sam Walton died in 1992, the company's 
communitarian ethos has long been identified with the founder's persona. 
As early as 1985, Forbes magazine calculated that Walton was then the richest 
man in the United States, but he still projected a sense of populist egalitari-
anism. Walton derided computer-age expertise and ostentatious displays 
of wealth, instead celebrating hard work, steadfast loyalty, and the mythos 
of small-town America as the key that unlocked success both for the cor-
poration and the individuals employed in its many stores and warehouses. 
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Although his company avidly adopted the latest telecommunications and 
inventory-control technologies, the founder deemphasized the centrality 
of all that hardware. "We are no tech; not high tech or low tech," Wal-
ton told thousands of admirers who attended his last shareholder meeting 
in 1991.13 
Walton and other executives institutionalized this imaginary social con-
struction through an adroit shift in the linguistic landscape. They labeled all 
employees "associates," routinely used first names in conversation and on 
identification badges, and renamed the personnel department the Walmart 
"people division." Associates who perform below par are not disciplined 
but rather "coached" to achieve their potential.14 Symbolic leveling of this 
sort often takes on a Carnivalesque flavor at the corporation's stadium-
size annual meeting, where top executives are put through skits, songs, 
and vaudeville-like routines that embarrass them before thousands of rau-
cous associates.15 Even more important than this faux classlessness is the 
Walmart culture of country, faith, and entrepreneurial achievement. Don 
Soderquist, Walmart's chief operating officer during the early years of the 
company's overseas expansion, has taken it on himself to be the foremost 
articulator of the Walmart culture. He wrote in his 2005 memoir, The Wal-
Mart Way, "I'm not saying that Wal-Mart is a Christian company, but I can 
unequivocally say that Sam founded the company on the Judeo-Christian 
principles found in the Bible."16 
Soderquist is right to emphasize the extent to which Walmart exists 
within a particular kind of Protestant cultural universe, even if corporate 
officers refrain from declaring this evangelical sensibility to be an overt 
component of the Walmart culture. Arising out of an American South that 
spawned so many megachurches and TV evangelists, Walmart is immersed 
in a Christian ethos that links personal salvation to entrepreneurial success 
and social service to free enterprise.17 Walmart publications are full of sto-
ries of hard-pressed associates, once down on their luck, who find redemp-
tion (economic and spiritual) through dedication to the company. Selfless 
service, to the customer, the community, and to Walmart, will soon reap 
its own reward. Thus a 1991 Associate Handbook declared that Walmart "be-
lieves management's responsibility is to provide leadership that serves the 
associate. Managers must support, encourage and provide opportunities 
for associates to be successful. Mr. Sam calls this 'Servant Leadership.'"18 
That phrase, which has gathered a subtle Christian connotation though 
secular in its first use, has appeared with increasing frequency in Walmart 
publications and also among a growing number of company vendors.19 
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